Agency Rulemaking: Unnecessary Delegation or Indispensable Assistance?
On June 18, 2019, the Federalist Society’s Article I Initiative and Regulatory Transparency Project hosted a panel on “Agency Rulemaking: Unnecessary Delegation or Indispensable Assistance?” at the National Press Club in Washington DC.
In his recent article, “Strategic Institutional Positioning: How We Have Come to Generate Environmental Law Without Congress,” Donald Kochan lays out the argument that delegation of authority to agencies serves the interests of both sides of Congress. What are the advantages and disadvantages of such a system? Should specialized bureaucrats do the lion’s share of rulemaking? Or should elected Senators and Congressman, often without the same level of expertise, write the rules that govern our nation?
Constitutional Accountability Center
Baker & Hostetler LLP
Professor of Law and Deputy Executive Director, Law and Economics Center
Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University
Professor of Law and Director, Environmental Law Program
University of Maryland School of Law
Federalist Society’s Article I Initiative