Deep Dive Episode 63 – Agency Rulemaking: Unnecessary Delegation or Indispensable Assistance?
On June 18, 2019, the Federalist Society’s Article I Initiative and Regulatory Transparency Project hosted a panel on “Agency Rulemaking: Unnecessary Delegation or Indispensable Assistance?” at the National Press Club in Washington, DC.
In his recent article, “Strategic Institutional Positioning: How We Have Come to Generate Environmental Law Without Congress,” published in the Texas A&M Law Review, Donald Kochan lays out the argument that delegation of authority to agencies serves the interests of both sides of Congress. Those ostensibly elected to oppose further regulation can argue that any proposed rule changes are out of their control. Conversely, representatives elected to increase regulation can blame agency heads for not following the intent of the authorizing statute. However, both sides avoid blame by the electorate.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of such a system? Should specialized bureaucrats do the lion’s share of rulemaking? Or should elected Senators and Congressman, often without the same level of expertise, write the rules that govern our nation?
Speakers
Professor of Law and Executive Director, Law and Economics Center
Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University
Professor of Law and Director, Environmental Law Program
University of Maryland School of Law
Topic
The Federalist Society and Regulatory Transparency Project take no position on particular legal or public policy matters. All expressions of opinion are those of the speaker(s). To join the debate, please email us at [email protected].
